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Abstract 
The paper investigates how European welfare states respond to reform pressures arising from 
European integration. We examine the impact of two institutional variables that mediate the 
impact of reform pressures on national pension systems: the extent of public pension 
provision and the number of national political veto points. We argue that, all else equal, 
member states with few veto points and a relatively small public pension sector are the most 
likely cases of policy change in response to Europeanization, whereas member states with a 
high number of veto points and extensive public pension commitments are the least likely 
candidates for policy change. We test these arguments on four cases of Europeanization in 
three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy).  
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1 Introduction 
  
The impact of European integration on national patterns of governance is a rapidly growing 
research area. Scholars have shifted from identifying the underlying dynamics of the 
European integration process to exploring the effects of EU membership on state-society 
relations, domestic policies and institutions (Héritier et al, 2001; Cowles et al, 2001; Börzel, 
2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Much of this growing literature focuses on direct 
pressures for national adaptation (directives, regulations, EC law) and policy areas that are 
open to EU influence because of the high level of EU competence (i.e. environmental policy). 
This paper takes a different approach by analysing both indirect and direct pressures for 
national adaptation in a policy area that is not yet very “Europeanized”: social policy.  
We investigate the impact of two types of European adaptational pressure on public pension 
arrangements: EC gender equality law and the EMU convergence criterion concerning 
excessive budget deficits. The former represents strong, binding, direct pressure for domestic 
policy change, and the latter constitutes diffuse, indirect pressure for domestic adaptation. 
For both types of European pressure, we investigate cases in which adaptational pressure was 
significant, so that this variable is held constant across cases. To explain variable patterns of 
adaptation across cases, we rely on two variables central to the literature on welfare state 
change: program structure and the number of veto points. We hypothesize that countries 
with low levels of public pension provision and few veto points are the most likely cases of 
substantial policy change in response to European pressures. Conversely, countries with 
many veto points and extensive public pension commitments are the least likely candidates 
for policy change, even when European pressures are strong. We use process-tracing based 
on primary and secondary sources to test these hypotheses, and we find that our model 
succeeds in providing a broad explanation of outcomes in all four cases. However, the model 
performed better in explaining the two cases of adaptation to equal treatment law than in our 
two cases of adaptation to the demands of EMU membership.  
The paper begins with a brief discussion of both the Europeanization and welfare state 
literatures. We then lay out our explanatory model based on program structure and veto 
points. The next two sections test the model for Belgian and Dutch adaptation to EC 
legislation concerning equality in statutory social security schemes, and Italian and Belgian 
adaptation to the Maastricht budget deficit target of 3%. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our analysis for the Europeanization literature. 
 
 
2 The Europeanization Literature 
 
This study follows Risse et al’s (2001: 3) conceptualisation of Europeanization as a ‘process 
by which distinct structures of governance at the European level affect domestic structures 
and domestic politics’. Europeanization, here, emphasizes the role of European politics and 
institutions as an independent variable in domestic politics, and it refers to the processes by 
which domestic structures adapt to European integration. A key finding of the 
Europeanization literature is that member states respond differently to pressures created by 
European integration (Dyson, 2000; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; della Porta and 
Caiani, 2006).  
The "goodness-of-fit" hypothesis has dominated the field for more than a decade. This type of 
argument emphasises the ways in which the degree of ‘fit’ between existing national and new 
European rules shapes domestic political adaptation (Duina, 1997). Thus, ‘the extent and 
type of policy change which takes place in a member state depends […] on the extent of legal 
adjustment that a country would have to achieve in order to close the gap between existing 
national policies and European integration’ (Héritier, 1997: 539). The underlying assumption 
here is that national resistance is often caused by poor policy fit between EU legislation and 
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existing national structures: the greater the misfit between EU and national policies, the more 
contentious the struggle to achieve correct and timely implementation will be. Conversely, 
when European rules demand only minor domestic policy modifications, thus not challenging 
traditional positions of institutional equilibria, it is unlikely that implementation will be difficult. 
A growing number of scholars have investigated the extent to which the fit between European 
and domestic structures explains the speed and correctness of the domestic implementation 
of EU rules, as well as the patterns of political contestation associated with national 
adjustment to European rules (Börzel, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Falkner et al, 2005; 
Kaeding, 2006). Empirical results, however, have been mixed; by itself, the goodness-of-fit 
hypothesis does not adequately explain Europeanization results. As Falkner et al. argue, ‘it is 
not the amount of policy misfit to be overcome that determines the implementation outcome' 
(Falkner et al., 2005: 342; 2007). In response, some scholars have proposed alternative 
explanations, such as governments’ party political preferences (Treib, 2003) and institutional 
veto points (Haverland 2000).  
We build on the central insight of this literature that European integration unleashes 
pressures for change that are mediated by domestic institutions and the domestic distribution 
of political resources. However, we want to go a step further by explicitly linking arguments 
about Europeanization to the broader literature in comparative politics and welfare state 
change. In our view, Europeanization is broadly similar to other pressures for change and can 
be analysed as such (see Anderson 2002). In other words, national responses to adaptational 
pressure are likely to be the result of political bargaining among actors with unequal 
resources within defined institutional settings, just as most other domestic political issues are.  
 
 
3 The Welfare State Literature 
 
The mainstream institutional literature on comparative welfare state development emphasizes 
three variables for explaining policy change: the structure of political institutions; the balance 
of power among social groups; and the political effects of program structure. We will discuss 
each in turn. 
 
The structure of political institutions: The central claim of arguments about the impact of 
institutions is that institutions provide the ‘rules of the game’ for political bargaining (Steinmo, 
Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). Rather than classifying political systems as parliamentary or 
presidential, much current research attempts to view political systems in terms of ‘veto 
points’ or ‘veto players’. The key argument here is that national political institutions provide 
the context for political bargaining and policy-making. Political institutions do not determine 
outcomes; rather they shape the way the political game is played. This includes the manner 
of interest group access to the political process and how political actors define their interests. 
Policymaking requires that proposed legislation pass through several stages during which 
various political groups can try to block the proposed legislation or demand changes in 
content. The more veto points in the legislative process, the more likely legislation is to fail or 
be diluted because more political actors (interest groups; political parties; intra-party factions; 
the public in the case of referendum, etc.) have access to the decision-making process 
(Immergut 1992).   
 
Program Structure and Policy Feedback Effects. The central insight of the ‘new politics of the 
welfare state’ literature is that the structure of existing welfare state programs influences the 
preferences and resources of political actors. Paul Pierson (1994) argues that the politics of 
retrenchment is very different from the dynamics of welfare state expansion. Whereas 
expansion policies are generally popular, retrenchment initiatives usually provoke public 
opposition. Thus retrenchment is politically difficult, largely because of the mobilizing 
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potential of interest groups and policy advocates that previous policies helped to create. The 
central claim of Pierson's new politics thesis is that retrenchment is a "distinctive and difficult 
enterprise" that is likely to involve political dynamics fundamentally different from those 
associated with welfare state expansion. Thus retrenchment involves a politics of "blame 
avoidance" rather than the "credit claiming" that characterizes the extension of welfare state 
policies. The upshot of the argument is that retrenchment is successful only when politicians 
are able to devise strategies that minimize popular opposition to proposed policy changes. 
Thus the new politics thesis portrays retrenchment as a politically risky process (Pierson, 
1994, 1-2). 
 
How does this basic insight apply to pensions? As Myles and Pierson (2001) argue, pensions 
are a classic case of path dependent change. Because pensions usually entail long-term, 
costly benefit commitments to large groups of voters, the structure of existing policies 
seriously constrains the prospects for reform. Moreover, the groups with a large stake in 
existing policies have an important impact on reform, not least because of the enormous 
political risks involved in scaling back and/or re-organizing pension arrangements (Pierson 
1994; Weaver and Pierson 1993).  
What does all of this tell us about the domestic variables that mediate adaptational pressures 
emanating from Europeanization? First, we know that political systems characterized by 
multiple veto points, or to use Tsebelis' terminology, political systems that empower multiple 
veto players, tend to reinforce the policy status quo. In other words, the more veto points 
there are, the more stable policy is. Table one provides a ranking of West European political 
systems that roughly follows the arguments laid out by Immergut and Tsebelis. Here, 
potential veto points are political parties (if there are multiparty coalitions); interest groups; 
second chambers of parliament; and subnational government units. While not a perfect 
measure of veto points, Colomer's (2002) 'institutional pluralism' rankings roughly 
approximate what we are emphasizing: the number of blocking opportunities provided by the 
political system and interest group structure. We use Colomer's pluralism index as a rough 
equivalent of 'veto opportunities." The higher the value on this index, the higher the number 
of veto opportunities. This means Germany ranks highest in terms of veto points, and the UK 
and Greece rank lowest. German institutions thus favour the status quo, while British and 
Greek institutions provide more opportunities for changing the policy status quo. 
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Table 1 Institutional pluralism in the Union’s member states  
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Germany 0 2 0 2 4 1.7 3 2 
Spain 0 1 0 2 3 100.0 1 1 
Finland 2 0 1 0 3 10.9 4 4 
Austria 1 1 1 1 3 33.8 2 2 
Belgium 2 1 0 0 3 8.3 4 4 
Denmark 2 0 0 0 2 42.9 1 2 
Italy 0 1 0 1 2 10.3 4-5 5 
France 1 1 1 0 2 53.1 2 2 
Netherlands 1 1 0 0 2 0.0 4 2-3 
Portugal 1 0 1 0 1 43.0 2 1 
Sweden 1 0 0 0 1 70.4 1 1 
Ireland 0 1 1 0 1 53.9 1 2 
United Kingdom 0 1 0 0 1 100.0 1 1 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 96.4   
 
Source:  Colomer (1996: 13); party system: measured by the effective number of parties; bicameralism: two 
points to symmetrical bicameralism; one point to semi-presidentialism; no points to parliamentarism; 
president elected: one point to semi-presidentialism; no points to parliamentarism; decentralization: 
measured by the proportion of public expenditure in the hand of regional governments (R): two points 
to R>20%; one point to 20%>R>10%; no points to R<10%. Lijpart (1999: 110) one-party cabinets 
(%): proportions of time during which one-party cabinets were in power. Tsebelis (UCLA website) veto 
players. 
 
 
Turning to our program structure variable, we know that two characteristics of pension 
schemes are important for understanding the dynamics of policy change. First, the maturity 
of pension schemes is crucial. Myles and Pierson (2001) argue that the maturity of a public 
pension system is a critical variable influencing reform outcomes; the longer a country has 
had a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system in place, the more difficult it is to reduce or 
privatise public pension commitments. Large, PAYG public pension schemes that cover all or 
most of the workforce generate commitments over many decades that are similar to property 
rights. In order for cutbacks or privatisation to be possible, current workers would have to 
pay twice: once for current pensioners in the public scheme and a second time for their own 
private pensions. Because the political costs of such a strategy are exceedingly high, major 
cutbacks or full-scale privatisation of public PAYG pensions is nearly impossible. 
For countries with mature, PAYG public pension schemes (Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands), past policies are highly constraining; policymakers and affected social 
interests make their policy choices in a context in which large scale cutbacks and/or 
privatisation is nearly impossible. The main options available are "parametric" reforms that 
introduce changes within the existing public pension structure. For example, benefit formulae 
can be made less generous, contributions can be raised, partial privatisation can be 
introduced to supplement public benefits etc. 
A second group of countries did not legislate earnings-related, PAYG public pensions during 
the decades immediately following World War II. This cluster includes Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the Southern European welfare states. Here there is usually a 
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basic form of public provision, and earnings-related benefits are organized collectively, 
usually as occupational pensions negotiated as part of collective wage agreements (Myles and 
Pierson 2001). Although earnings-related pensions are organized by the market and not the 
state, the role of the state is still crucial in terms of regulation. For example, the Dutch 
regulatory framework establishes rules for investment and capital coverage, and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs can extend mandatory pension provision to entire sectors and branches in the 
economy. The result is a coverage level of about 92% (SER 2001). However, the provisions of 
specific pension schemes (premiums; benefit formula, indexing etc) are left to corporatist 
pension fund boards. In Switzerland, regulation appears even tougher; state regulation 
mandates a minimum rate of return, for example (Bonoli 2007). 
The second aspect of program structure is closely related to the first: the size of the public 
pension schemes relative to private schemes. Basically, the argument here is that where 
mature public pension schemes dominate retirement provision, voters (both current workers 
and current pensioners) have a large stake in the status quo because public pensions are or 
will be the main source of their retirement income. This means that the stickiness of the 
status quo should be stronger in countries like Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Belgium, which 
all have comprehensive, mature, public pension schemes and relatively small or even 
insignificant private/occupational pension schemes. In contrast, countries like the Netherlands, 
Denmark and the UK have large private/occupational pension sectors (see table 2). These 
countries also have significant basic public pensions (less true for the UK), but about half to 
one third of retirement income comes from occupational pensions, so the status quo should 
less sticky because pensioners have other sources of income besides the public pensions. 
 
Table 2 Public/private mix in pensions 
 
 Share of public pensions in retirement income  %, 1998 a 
Italy 48.5 b 
Germany 81.9 
Sweden 71.1 
France 68.3 
Belgium data not available 
Netherlands 63.3 
United Kingdom 60.8 
 
a Source is Axel Börsch-Supan and Anette Reil-Held, Retirement Income: Level, Risk and Subsitution among 
Income Components, OECD Working Paper AWP 3.7. table 2.  
b Many Italians past retirement age still work; income from earnings accounts for 27.2% of income in 
retirement, and asset income is 24.3%. Few have private pensions. 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the basic argument: member states with few veto points and relatively 
small public pension sectors (defined in terms of maturity and size relative to private and 
occupational pensions) are expected to be the most likely cases of policy change in the face 
of adaptational pressures from Europe. Countries with a high number of veto points and large 
public pension sectors are expected to be the least likely candidates for policy change. 
Countries with either many veto points and a small public pension sector OR few veto points 
and a large public pension system are expected to fall between these two extremes.  
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Table 3 Factors influencing the likelihood of policy change 
 
Veto points   
low high 
 
low 
substantial change 
 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
 
Portugal 
 
 
←Spain b  
Extent of 
public 
provision 
 
high 
 
Sweden 
little change 
 
Germany 
Belgium 
←Italy a 
 
a Italy is difficult to classify because veto points are not as numerous as in Germany and Belgium. 
b Spain is also difficult to classify for the same reason; Spanish public pensions are not extensive in absolute 
terms, but relative to private and occupational pensions they are. 
 
 
 
4 Adaptation to European Pressures for Change 
 
4.1 Belgium, the Netherlands, and the implementation of EC Directive 79/7/EEC 
 
In 1978, the European Council adopted a directive requiring the member states to remove all 
provisions in statutory social security schemes that violated the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women. The directive prohibited member states from discriminating in 
terms of access, the calculation and payment of contributions, and the calculation of benefits. 
The directive created substantial adaptational pressure for member states with ‘breadwinner’ 
based social security schemes that excluded married women (because a breadwinner benefit 
was available only to the husband) or unmarried women (because the assumption was that 
they would get married at some later point and benefit from their husbands’ benefits). The 
deadline for transposition was December 19, 1985.  
Here we look at two cases in which adaptational pressure was high because public pensions 
were organized on the breadwinner principle (Netherlands) or because pension entitlement 
rules were different for men and women (Belgium). We assume that adaptational pressure is 
held constant, so the main difference between the two cases is that the Netherlands is a case 
of ‘likely change’ because of few veto points/small public pension sector and Belgium is 
expected to be a case of ‘limited change’ because of multiple veto points and an extensive 
public pension scheme.  
 
Belgium 
The Belgian political system displays multiple veto points because of federalism, a strong 
linguistic cleavage, and a multiparty system. Public pension provision dominates; the 
occupational pension system is relatively underdeveloped ,and only the relatively affluent 
have access to private pensions. This means that organized interests with a stake in the 
status quo have strong preferences, and the political decision-making system offers many 
opportunities for blocking legislation (Anderson, et al. 2007). 
Belgium was slow to transpose Directive 79/7 EEC. Even after the transposition deadline had 
passed, Belgium still had legislation in place that included different benefit formulae for men 
and women (40 years of contributions for women and 45 for men) and different retirement 
ages. Indeed, Belgium failed to transpose on time, and the ECJ found Belgium in violation of 
EC law in 1986. The Christian Democratic/Liberal government responded by trying to 
harmonize retirement ages for men and women, as well as the benefit formula, as part of its 
"St. Anna Plan," a package of budget consolidation measures.  Discussion focused on 
whether to increase women’s retirement age to 65 or lower men's to 60. Unions vigorously 
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opposed increasing women’s required labour market participation from 40 to 45 years for a 
full pension, as well as the higher retirement age for women. When the government consulted 
the social partners through the NAR (institutionalised bipartite council for negotiation which 
needs to be consulted on social reforms), the NAR (including the employers) took the same 
position as the unions. The NAR's rationale for rejecting the reform was the problem of high 
benefit dependency among employees older than 50. Increasing the retirement age from 60 
to 65 would create funding shortfalls in other social benefit schemes (De Standaard, 14 and 
19 January 1987). Moreover, unions argued that more favourable rules for women should 
remain in place because of gender discrimination in the labour market. 
Soon after the government announced the details of the St. Anna plan in May 1986, the 
socialist trade union FGTB/ABVV responded with widespread demonstrations. The Christian 
trade union ACV/CSC was less confrontational but nevertheless joined the socialist unions in 
criticising the plan. The government backed down somewhat and proposed minor changes to 
the St. Anna plan in June, but the unions were not placated. The government modified the 
plan again (such as postponing the decision on statutory retirement age and the benefit 
formula for women) after another series of talks with the social partners, but the unions stuck 
to their opposition. After this round of concessions, the unions abandoned their strikes in the 
summer, and on 16 July 1986 the government enacted the watered down St. Anna Plan in a 
series of Royal Decrees. The question of the equalization of retirement ages, as well as a 
standard benefit formula for men and women, was not solved, however, and both would 
remain on the decision agenda for the next ten years.  
The issue lay dormant until 1990, when the introduction of unisex rules for a flexible 
retirement age in 1990 was intended to prevent another challenge by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). In 1990, the government introduced a flexible retirement age that made men's 
and women's retirement age de facto equal. However, the benefit formula was still different 
for men and women (40 years of contributions for women and 45 years for men). This was 
considered discriminatory. Belgium wanted to keep the lower number of contribution years 
for women, but financial concerns meant that Belgium could not afford to apply this rule to 
men. The Minister of Pensions continued to argue that the 1990 legislation satisfied European 
legal requirements; at the same time, there was much public speculation, especially in the 
press, that the European Court would rule against Belgium because of different contribution 
periods for men and women (Anderson et al. 2007, 328). In July 1993 the European Court 
found Belgium in violation of directive 1979/7 concerning equal treatment in social security 
and instructed Belgium to change its legislation (Le Soir, January 6, 1995). 
Belgium’s EMU aspirations provided the political capital necessary to introduce the changes 
that had hitherto proven so difficult. In April 1996, the four largest parties in the Cabinet 
requested special powers from Parliament in order to adopt legislation enabling Belgium to 
meet the most difficult Maastricht convergence criterion: the 3% budget deficit target. The 
“Social Framework Law” adopted in July 1996 increased the reference period for women’s 
pensions from 40 to 45 years. A second law passed on June 19, 1996 dealt with women’s 
retirement age. The government agreed to gradually raise women's retirement age to 65 
starting in 1997 so that by 2009 the retirement age is 65. Every three years it goes up by 
one year. In order to minimize negative effects, the rules for the minimum pension were 
relaxed somewhat (Anderson et al. 2007).  
To summarize, Belgian adaptation to Directive 77/7/EEC was extremely slow, incorrect, and 
incomplete. Only after the ECJ found Belgium in violation of EC law twice was the government 
able to introduce the necessary changes. Moreover, it was the extraordinary policy-making 
opportunity provided by the run-up to EMU that facilitated the passage of legislation. It seems 
obvious that the multiple veto points in the Belgian political system provided opportunities for 
opponents to block policy change. And given the importance of the public pension in the 
retirement packages of most Belgian women, there was massive opposition. Unions promoted 
the cause of women and prevented two governments from making their planned changes. 
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Netherlands 
Dutch political decision-making institutions are relatively centralized but the multiparty 
system produces multiparty cabinets. However, the Netherlands scores high on the Colomer 
scale, so we classify it as having few veto points. In terms of the structure of the pension 
system, two characteristics are relevant here. First, the Dutch public scheme provides a flat-
rate (but relatively generous) benefit, and second, mandated occupational pensions provide 
the rest of retirement income for most people. The public pension (AOW) provides about half 
of retirement income and occupational pensions and private pensions provide the rest.1 The 
low number of veto points and the relatively small size of the public pension sector make the 
Netherlands a case of ‘likely” policy change according to our model. 
The structure of the Dutch public pension scheme, like the Belgian, conflicted with the 
provisions of Directive 79/7/EEC on equal treatment in statutory social security schemes. 
Both the financing and the benefit structure of the AOW had been based on the breadwinner 
principle since its introduction in 1957. Only breadwinners paid AOW contributions (even if 
the spouse was employed), and at retirement the breadwinner (usually the husband) received 
a benefit intended for both spouses, while singles received an individual benefit (Anderson 
2007). 
Although the AOW's breadwinner structure attracted little criticism before the publication of 
the 1979 EU directive, Dutch policymakers set out quickly to modify existing social security 
schemes. The process was far from smooth: it took five years, and the government nearly 
missed the transposition deadline. In contrast to other parts of the social insurance system 
that violated EU equality law (like the breadwinner provisions in the unemployment insurance 
scheme), bringing the AOW in line with EU law did not require additional AOW pension 
spending and did not result in direct benefit cuts. There was, however, one distributional 
problem: some pensioners would receive smaller AOW pensions because of the indirect 
effects of the changes.  
The governing coalition, Lubbers I, (Christian Democrats, CDA; and Liberals, VVD) decided to 
simply divide the AOW benefit for couples in half and pay an individual benefit to both 
spouses. Couples in which both spouses had reached the pension age experienced no losses. 
The question of how to deal with couples in which one spouse had not reached retirement age, 
however, proved to be very difficult. 
In July 1981, the State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment asked the Social 
Economic Council (SER) for an advisory opinion about how to adjust the AOW to conform to 
European law. The cabinet had already expressed its preference for a new AOW benefit 
structure giving single pensioners 70% and spouses 50% of the current benefit for married 
breadwinners. Married pensioners whose spouse was younger than 65 (and not entitled to the 
newly individualized benefit) would receive a supplement. In its advice, the SER sided with 
the cabinet but emphasized that the solution should be revenue-neutral (SER 1984).  
The cabinet introduced its legislative proposal in late 1984. There was little disagreement 
about the core elements of the legislation (dividing the AOW benefit in two for couples, etc.) 
but it was difficult for Parliament to agree on what to do about AOW pensioners with a spouse 
younger than 65. In the old system, an AOW breadwinner pensioner included a benefit for the 
spouse, even if he/she was younger than 65. In order to prevent income losses for this group, 
the proposed legislation included a supplement for the spouse younger than 65. The difficult 
issue was how to treat spouses younger than 65 with earned income. If the younger spouse 
was not the breadwinner then he/she paid no AOW premiums and the spouse received the 
full AOW couple's pension. The original bill provided a 50% supplement (dependent on the 
income of the younger spouse) for AOW pensioners supporting a spouse younger than 65. 
After opposition, the income test was suspended for three years (Financiële Dagblad, 19 
January 1985).  
                                                 
1 See Anderson (2007) and Haverland (2001) for details. 
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One of the governing parties, the VVD rejected income-testing of the supplement, proposing 
instead that pensioners with spouses younger than 65 receive the full AOW pension, 
regardless of the spouse's income. The Labour Party (PvdA) opposed this solution, arguing 
that it discouraged employment for the younger spouse. Instead, the PvdA proposed a longer 
transition period (five years) during which AOW pensioners with spouses under 65 would 
receive the full couple's benefit (Financiële Dagblad, 31 January 1985). The CDA and PvdA 
later agreed to modify the proposal by increasing the amount of income (of the younger 
spouse) not subject to the income test (Financiële Dagblad, 1 February 1985). The VVD 
responded with an amendment to exempt AOW spouses younger than 57 from the income 
test, but this attempt failed because of lack of support. On March 1 the Second Chamber 
adopted the CDA-PvdA version of the bill (Financiële Dagblad, March 2, 1985).2 
The First Chamber nearly blocked the Second Chamber's compromise bill. Members of both 
the CDA and PvdA fractions in the First Chamber opposed the legislation because of the 
negative financial effects for AOW households with a spouse younger than 65 (Financiële 
Dagblad, 21 March 1985). The First Chamber finally approved the legislation.  
To summarize, Dutch transposition of 79/7/EEC was slow, and the potential negative 
consequences for some households nearly prevented a compromise solution. Broadly 
speaking, the relatively low number of veto points in the Dutch system facilitated adaptation; 
interest groups did not take to the streets to protest potential losses for some households, as 
in Belgium. Consistent with our expectations about the effects of program structure, 
politicians appeared unwilling to risk punishment by voters; indeed, politicians tried to find a 
solution that would have few if any negative financial consequences for voters. However, this 
expectation applies to both pension systems dominated by public provision and systems (like 
the Dutch) in which public provision provides roughly half of retirement income. This suggests 
that even multi-pillar pension systems, which combine both public and private provision, are 
prone to the same sorts of political constraints that overwhelmingly public systems are. 
 
 
4.2 EMU and Adaptational Pressure 
 
Our second case of European pressure for reform is EMU. In terms of fiscal discipline, the 
Maastricht convergence criteria--later formalized in the Stability and Growth Pact-- create a 
powerful constraint on national policy choices (Kurzer 1993, Featherstone 2004). Market 
actors use the convergence criteria as a critical information shortcut when they make their 
investment decisions because governments themselves use them to guide policy. To the 
extent that pension schemes are perceived to contribute to unacceptable budget deficits, 
there may be pressures for pension reform in order to cut costs and restore budget balance. 
Implementation of the pact rests primarily on two pillars: the principle of multilateral 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the excessive deficit procedure. 
This type of European pressure for reform differs from the binding constraints of EC law. In 
the run-up to EMU, the member states had to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria in 
order to 'qualify' for participation in the Eurozone, and the 3% budget deficit limit was a key 
constraint. However, member states were free to take whatever measures they deemed 
necessary to achieve the target; they could choose any combination of spending cuts and tax 
increases, as long as the target was met. Our expectation here is that in the member states 
facing substantial pressure to cut deficits, pension reform should have been a natural target 
because pension spending is typically the most expensive program in public budgets.  
We focus on two countries that faced substantial pressure to reduce their deficits in the run-
up to EMU: Belgium, and Italy. Both countries had deficits between 5 and 10% of GDP so 
                                                 
2 The final version awarded the full couple's AOW pension to the pensioner over 65 with a spouse under 65 
without her own income. If the younger spouse had her own income, the supplement for the spouse was 
proportionally reduced. 
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they had a long way to go before they met the 3% target. Both countries adopted ambitious 
plans to reduce public spending, and surprisingly, pension reform was a key goal in both 
countries. 
 
Italy 
We classify the Italian political system as a case of moderately low veto points. Like the 
Netherlands, Italy has a score of 2 on the Colomer institutional pluralism index. As we noted 
earlier, public pension provision dominates retirement income, although many over the age of 
65 continue to work. An important feature of the pension system was that the weakness of 
the pension system were widely acknowledged. In addition, there were many calls for reform 
in the 1980s where pensions, in particular, have figured prominently in debates about how to 
restore public finances (Sbragia 2001; Anderson 2002; Ferrera and Jessoula 2007).  
In comparison with the other two case studies, Italy spends the highest proportion of GDP on 
pensions (see table 4). In 1960, pension spending was 5% of GDP, and grew to 14.9% of 
DGP in 1990. By 1999, Italy was spending 15.7 of GDP on pensions (Franco 2000). This high 
level of spending, combined with low fertility and already high levels of public debt made 
pension reform the centrepiece of reforms. 
 
Table 4 Italy: public deficit (as %GDP) 
 
year Public deficit as %GDP 
1993 -9.4 
1994 -9.1 
1995 -7.6 
1996 -7.1 
1997 -2.7 
1998 -2.8 
1999 -1.8 
2000 -0.3 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various years. 
 
 
The years 1992-1997 saw several substantial reforms. The 1992 reform passed under the 
Amato government was one of the most important and had three broad aims: cost 
containment, reducing fraud and inefficiency and removing dysfunctional program aspects. 
The Amato reform came after decades of inaction and was the first major attempt to reduce 
pension expenditure. In brief, it increased the minimum contribution period from 15 to 20 
years, tightened rules of seniority pensions and increased the retirement age for men (65) 
and women (60) in the private sector by five years. In addition, it included provisions for the 
gradual harmonisation of public and private sector pensions, introduced a more restrictive 
benefit formula and a shift from a wage indexing to price indexing, and increased 
contributions (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000). Although the Amato reform was important for 
promoting harmonization and cost containment, its impact was limited because of long 
phase-in periods (Ferrera and Jessoula, 2007, 433). 
It was, however, not before the 1995 Dini government that Italy continued its reform efforts 
in line with the first Amato reform package. Although the 1994 Berlusconi reforms intended to 
tackle issues such as seniority pensions, the level of benefits for older workers and the 
pension of current retirees, the reforms did more to promote the interests of employers than 
unions. Not surprisingly, the reforms failed (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007, 435). 
In 1995, the Dini government adopted another major reform package. This ´revolutionary´ 
package (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000) was more ambitious that previous legislation in three 
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respects: stabilising pension spending as a proportion of GDP, reducing inequity and 
removing labour market disincentives. On May 8, 1995, the government signed a formal 
agreement with the unions, which later polled workers to get their approval of the reform 
draft (Baccaro 2002). More specifically, it included, starting in 2013, the switch from defined 
benefits to defined contributions, standardization of public and private sector pension 
regulations, the gradual abolition of seniority pensions and the introduction of a flexible 
retirement age (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007). 
In the end, the combined effect of these measures resulted in the cancellation of at least one 
fourth of net pension liabilities with the accumulated pension liabilities decreasing from 389% 
of GDP to 278% of GDP. Mainly three reasons put pension reform on the top of the political 
agenda (Anderson, 2002). First, the weakness of the Italian pension system were well-known 
and there was widespread doubt that the pension system could meet its future obligations 
without massive increases in contributions. Demographic trends alone were predicted to 
increase spending by 50% between the early 1990s (14%) to 2040 (23%). Second, the 
collapse of the party system in the wake of political scandals in the early 1990s (Tangentopoli 
scandal) created a window of opportunity for reform. But most important, the 1992-1995 
reforms were substantially influenced by the EMU process. The deadlines for achieving the 
EMU convergence criteria created considerable pressure on the Italian authorities. According 
to one analyst, ´the misfit between Italian public finances and the Maastricht requirements 
was widely considered the most significant in the European Union´(Sbragia 2001, 80). Indeed, 
it was widely feared that Italy would not qualify for the first round of EMU. Because of the 
very high mass and elite support for Italian EMU participation, the adaptational pressures 
from EMU were ´extraordinary´. As Ferrera and Gualmini argue, (2000, 204) ´the deadlines 
fixed at Maastricht in February 1992 forced Italy to make an immediate and radical effort to 
reform and correct its public finances in order to halt the growth of public debt.´ 
In sum, the success of the Italian pension reforms hinged on mainly two political factors. First, 
there was widespread agreement that the Italian pension system required significant reform. 
When pension reform began to be seen as an important element in Italy's quest to qualify for 
EMU, this helped to change preferences on the part of both the governing elite and the social 
partners. Unions were crucial actors in this process because their consent was considered 
indispensable. The potential benefit of Italian EMU participation, among others, persuaded 
union leaders to accept substantial reforms (Baccaro, 2002). Second, the collapse of the 
Italian party system at the end of the 1980s/beginning 1990s allowed reform-minded 
politicians to overcome traditional parliamentary obstacles. The Italian government 
negotiated directly with the social partners and convinced the unions of the benefits of 
adjustment and long-term advantages of sound finances in particular. The growing debt 
burden of the Italian state would not only threaten EMU entry but also divert more and more 
resources from social insurance spending. In sum, adaptational pressures from EMU and 
persuasion through a negotiated policy making style helped unions to accept pension cuts in 
order to reduce debt payments by the state and to enable political actors to overcome the 
otherwise considerable electoral risks associated with pension reform. 
 
Belgium 
The link between pension reform in Belgium and the goal of qualifying for EMU is less well-
known than the Italian case, but the two cases share striking similarities. In both cases, 
qualifying for EMU was defined as a national project requiring extraordinary policymaking. To 
borrow from Kingdon (2003), EMU created a huge window for reform. 
Qualifying for EMU dominated Belgian politics in the mid-1990s. Like Italy, Belgium suffered 
from recurring budget deficits since the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1990 general government 
net lending hovered between 5 and 10% of GDP. More ominously, net general government 
debt as percent of GDP reached the 100% mark in the mid 1980s and reached 124% of GDP 
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by 1994. In order to qualify for the third state of EMU, Belgian governments would have to 
substantially change fiscal policy. 
The Dehaene II government (Christian Democrats and Socialists) took office after early 
elections were held on May 21, 1995 to strengthen the government's budget consolidation 
efforts.3 Two core elements of the government's strategy were social security reform and a 
new law on competitiveness. By this time, the Prime Minister Dehaene acknowledged the 
serious decline in the pension system’s earnings replacement function. In order to 
compensate for the declining value of the public pensions, employees and employers were 
encouraged to improve supplementary pensions. At the same time, the campaign to qualify 
for EMU would provide the government with the political resources necessary to secure 
approval for several of its pension reform goals. 
In April 1996 the cabinet requested "special powers" from Parliament in order to legislate 
framework laws in three areas: government finances; modernization of social security; and 
employment). The government's strategy was obvious: this fast-track procedure would 
sidestep direct opposition and speed up decision-making. The framework laws contained the 
broad outlines of policy, with the details specified in royal decrees. In concrete terms the 
government requested permission to take all necessary measures needed in order to reduce 
the deficit to 3% and to guarantee the financial balance of the social security system, 
including pensions. The opposition's criticism of the government's strategy had little effect, 
and discussion of the three laws in the lower chamber began on June 12. Six weeks later the 
lower chamber had approved all three framework laws. 
There were two main framework laws. First, the "EMU Law" gave the government until August 
31, 1997 the authority to adopt a broad range of fiscal policy measures necessary to enable 
Belgium to join EMU as long as low-income groups were protected and the measures did not 
conflict with efforts under way to modernize other parts of the social security system. Second, 
the "Social Framework Law" included measures to modernize the social security system so 
that it more effectively combined the goals of social insurance and solidarity, This included 
measures to strengthen the financing side, introduce alternative methods of financing, 
improve administration and reduce fraud. The right to the minimum pension was also 
expanded. The framework law gave the government the power to take any and all decisions it 
deemed necessary to reach these goals.  
The role of EMU membership was a crucial factor allowing the government to gain passage of 
social insurance and pension reform. As the Governor of the Central Bank, Fons Verplaetse, 
put it: "if Belgium misses the train for the European common currency, the unity of the 
country is endangered." (de Weerdt, 1997) 
 
Table 5 Budget deficit: reference value: -3.0% of GDP 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 a 
Belgium -4.2 -3.7 -2.1 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 0.4  (0.2) 0.4 
Italy -8.2 -7.0 -2.7 -2.8 -1.7 -0.6  (-1.8) -2.6 -2.8 
EU15 -5.3 -4.1 -2.5 -1.7 -0.7 0.9  (-0.3) -0.9 -2.6 
Euro area -5.3 -4.2 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 0.1  (-1.0) -1.6 -2.7 
 
a Figures based on www.eurostat.eu and economic forecasting by the Commission, autumn 2003. The 
exceptional revenue from UMTS licences had a significant impact on some Member States' budget deficits 
in 2000-2002. In these cases, the figure between brackets indicates the deficit without this additional 
revenue.  
 
 
                                                 
3 This was the first election after the constitutional reform. New laws such as those on the reduced assembly 
size of parliament, three new regional parliaments, and separate competences between federal and 
subnational levels of government had come into force in the past period. 
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5 Discussion 
 
Obviously our four case studies are not a complete test of the model, so our results are only 
suggestive. The case studies show that our model of domestic adaptation to European 
pressures for change is only moderately successful in explaining outcomes. The two cases of 
domestic adaptation to the requirements of Directive 79/7/EEC broadly confirm our 
expectations. The multiple veto points of the Belgian political system and the entrenched and 
influential interests attached to the public pension system made policy change difficult and 
slow. Only after Belgium was hauled into European court on two occasions were the 
necessary changes made. This suggests that even when European adaptational pressures are 
very strong, domestic institutional variables may still impede and/or slow down policy change. 
Our expectation for the Dutch case is broadly confirmed; domestic adaptation was correct 
and punctual, but the processes of negotiating adaptation was fraught with difficulties, largely 
because of potential negative financial consequences for some households. The low number 
of veto points and the more limited extent of public provision in the Netherlands should have 
facilitated adaptation because the preferences of organized interests should not have been as 
intense as in Belgium and the political system offers fewer veto opportunities. We find that 
this explanation only explains part of the Dutch story. 
We argued that our model should be capable of explaining domestic adaptation to both 
strong/direct pressures for change as well as indirect/diffuse pressures for change such as 
those created by the Maastricht budget deficit limit of 3%. Our two cases of domestic 
adaptation to the deficit target demonstrate the limits of our model. In the Belgian case, our 
model predicts less adaptation than actually occurred because the Belgian political system is 
full of veto points, and the maturity and scope of the public pension system mean that 
organized interests have intense preferences about preserving the status quo. In other words, 
we should not have seen as much pension reform in Belgium. The Italian case also causes 
problems for our model. Although not as veto-prone as Belgium, the scope and maturity of 
the public pension system should have made reform more difficult for vote-seeking politicians 
afraid of electoral risks.  
How do we reconcile these findings with our model? The obvious answer is that the run-up to 
EMU was an extraordinary episode in the history of European integration, and basically the 
only period in which the EMU constraint is likely to substantially influence domestic fiscal 
policies. Indeed, the recent weakening of the Stability and Growth Pact at the behest of 
Germany and France confirm this line of argument. This suggests that the reform pressures 
emanating from EMU in the years immediately prior to 1998 are unlikely to be repeated. To 
be sure, EMU is still a constraint, but it is a shadow of its former self. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
What do our findings suggest for the study of domestic adaptation to Europe? First, we want 
to emphasize the value of using carefully constructed theoretical arguments drawn from the 
literatures on comparative politics and public policy to explain domestic adaptation to 
European integration. If our goal is to understand how national governments adapt policies 
and practices to European requirements, however these are defined, it makes sense to start 
by asking what the existing literatures in specific policy fields or areas have to say about 
change. For social policy this means looking at the welfare state literature; for environmental 
policy this means drawing on insights from existing studies of national environmental 
policymaking. It is not clear from the existing Europeanization literature that there is any 
added value in constructing ad hoc explanations for domestic adaptation. And if national 
adjustment is basically a domestic political game, it makes sense to use our existing models 
of institutional change to explain adaptation to Europe. 
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We think that our analysis demonstrates the utility of drawing on existing explanations of 
policy change, even if our results were not always in line with expectations. We have shown 
that our model broadly explains the dynamics of change in the Belgian and Dutch 
implementation of Directive 79/7/EEC and is partially successful in explaining the Italian and 
Belgian pension reforms in the run-up to EMU.  
Finally, we want to stress the importance of comparing national adaptations to different kinds 
of European pressures. If our models of domestic adaptation are any good, they should be 
able to explain not just the transposition of directives, but also the ways in which member 
states adapt to the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, the completion of the 
internal market, and other types of reform pressures. 
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